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Economic Theory of Choice and the Preference 
Reversal Phenomenon: Reply 
By DAVID M. GRETHER AND CHARLES R. PLOTT* 
We feel the contribution of Werner Pom- 
merehne, Friedrich Schneider, and Peter 
Zweifel's (hereafter P-S-Z) comment is some- 
what obscured by the wording of the conclu- 
sions. The following summary is offered. 
1) The preference reversal phenomenon 
was observed by P-S-Z under substantially 
different conditions than those studied in 
our earlier paper (G-P). The subject pools 
differed. The experiments differed. The lan- 
guage differed, so naturally the questions 
were "framed" differently. Substantially dif- 
ferent motivation conditions were imposed. 
Nevertheless, the phenomenon was there. 
P-S-Z did observe lower rates than G-P, 
but a claim that this was due to a higher 
incentive structure seems a bit premature. 
Since P-S-Z did not conduct a control with 
the G-P incentives, any of the above van- 
ables could account for the differences. Fur- 
thermore, the P-S-Z payment scheme is dif- 
ferent from G-P but it is not obvious that the 
incentives were greater. 
2) An increase in the potential payoff 
for a "win" sufficient to give it a higher 
expected value while leaving other variables 
the same did not substantially reduce the 
reversals of those who chose the P bet. 
3) Replication of the experience does 
not reduce the frequency of reversals by those 
who chose a P bet. 
4) Access to records of previous deci- 
sions does not change the rate of reversals. 
5) Experience and records can change 
behavior but the reversal rate is substantially 
unaffected. 
In their closing remarks, P-S-Z suggest a 
move outside the framework of the expected 
utility theory and reference prospect theory 
(see their fn. 8) as a candidate. We need to 
reemphasize that the phenomenon causes 
problems for preference theory in general, 
and not for just the expected utility theory. 
Prospect theory as a special type of prefer- 
ence theory cannot account for the results. *California Institute of Technology. 
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